1 CONICET -Universidad de Buenos Aires 2 Universidad de Buenos Aires
1.-Introduction
Information is everywhere, shaping our discourses and our thoughts. In everyday life, we know that the information spread by the media may trigger deep social, economical and political changes. In science, the concept of information has pervaded almost all scientific disciplines, from physics and chemistry to biology and psychology.
Philosophy has echoed this situation in a number of articles in journals and books devoted to elucidate and analyze the concept of information in its different meanings.
In the field of the philosophy of physics, Christopher Timpson (2003 Timpson ( , 2004 Timpson ( , 2005 Timpson ( , 2006 Timpson ( , 2008 Timpson ( , 2013 has published several works where he accurately designs an interpretation of the technical concept of information, that is, of the concept as used in information theory. In particular, he proposes a deflationary view about information, according to which the term 'information' is an abstract noun and, as a consequence, information is not part of the material contents of the world. This innovative and well articulated view has had a great impact on the philosophy of physics, especially among authors interested in the use of the concept of information for interpreting physical theories. For this reason, Timpson's proposal deserves to be critically analyzed in detail, in order to assess the consequences usually drawn from it. The main purpose of the present article consists precisely in supplying such a critical analysis.
On this basis, in Section 2 we will begin by recalling certain basic distinctions regarding the concept of information: this will allow us to focus on the technical statistical concept of information. Then, in Section 3, we will analyze Timpson's reading of Shannon's theory, considering the conceptual consequences of that reading. Section 4 will be devoted to recall and analyze the arguments appealed to by Timpson to ground his deflationary view of information; this analysis will lead us to claim that information is an item even more abstract than what Timpson claims. This conclusion will lead us, in Section 5, to wonder if the abstract nature of information prevents us to conceive it as a physical item. The negative answer to this question will allow us to consider, in Section 6, the differences between the epistemic and the physical interpretation of information, and to propose, in Section 7, in contrast with Timpson's monist interpretation, a pluralist view about information, according to which, even on the basis of a single formalism, the concept of information admits a variety of interpretations, each one useful in a different context.
2.-Which information?
As many recognize, information is a polysemantic concept that can be associated with different phenomena (Floridi 2010) . In this conceptual tangle, the first distinction to be introduced in philosophy is that between a semantic and a non-semantic view of information. According to the first view, information is something that carries semantic content (Bar-Hillel and Carnap 1953; Bar-Hillel 1964 , Floridi 2013 ; it is therefore strongly related with semantic notions such as reference, meaning and representation. In general, semantic information is carried by propositions that intend to represent states of affairs; so, it has intentionality, "aboutness", that is, it is directed to other things. And although it remains controversial whether false factual content may qualify as information, semantic information maintains strong links with the notion of truth.
Non-semantic information, also called 'mathematical' or 'statistical', is concerned with the statistical properties of a system and/or the correlations between the states of two systems, independently of the meanings of those states. The classical locus of mathematical information is the paper where Claude Shannon (1948) introduces a precise formalism designed to solve certain specific technological problems. Shannon's theory is purely quantitative: it ignores any issue related to informational content: " [the] semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. The significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of possible messages." (Shannon 1948, p. 379) .
Although very widespread (see also Floridi 2013 , Adriaans 2013 , the distinction between semantic and non-semantic information is not considered by Timpson. According to the author, the first and most important distinction is that between the everyday notion of information and the technical concept of information, such as that derived from the work of Shannon (Timpson 2004, pp. 4-5) . 1 The everyday notion of information is intimately associated with the concepts of knowledge, language and 1 Here we will always refer to Timpson' s PhD dissertation at the University of Oxford (Timpson 2004) , and not to the published version (Timpson 2013) , because the dissertation was the original source of the great impact of Timpson's proposal.
− A destination D, which receives the message.
The source S is a system with a range of possible states 1 ,. 
When 'log' is the logarithm to the base 2, the resulting unit of measurement for ( ) H S and ( ) H D is called 'bit', contraction of binary unit. If the natural logarithm is used, the unit of measurement is the nat, contraction of natural unit, and in the case of the logarithm to base 10, the unit is the Hartley.
The channel CH is defined by the matrix ( ) H S D is the information generated at the source S and received at the destination D:
E is the information generated at S but not received at D, and N is the information received at D but not generated at S. Equivocation E and noise N are measures of the dependence between source and destination and, therefore, are functions not only of S and R, but also of the channel CH. Thus, they are computed as
where
The channel capacity C is defined as:
where the maximum is taken over all the possible distributions ( ) i p s at the source. C is the largest amount of information that can be transmitted over the communication channel CH.
One of the most relevant results in Shannon's theory is the noiseless coding theorem (or First Shannon Theorem), according to which the value of the entropy ( ) H S of the source is equal to the average number of symbols necessary to code a letter of the source using an ideal code: ( ) H S measures the optimal compression of the source messages. In fact, the messages of N letters produced by S fall into two classes:
one of approximately ( ) 2 NH S typical messages, and the other of atypical messages.
When N → ∞ , the probability of an atypical message becomes negligible; so, the source can be conceived as producing only ( ) 2 NH S possible messages. This suggests a natural strategy for coding: each typical message is coded by a binary sequence of length ( ) NH S , in general shorter than the length N of the original message.
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In turn, the noisy coding theorem (or Second Shannon Theorem) proves that the information transmitted over a communication channel can be increased without increasing the probability of error as long as the communication rate is maintained below the channel capacity. In other words, the channel capacity is equal to the maximum rate at which the information can be sent over the channel and recovered at the destination with a vanishingly low probability of error. of the source and the destination and, therefore, they are conceived as measures of the information generated at the source and received at the destination, respectively. This is Shannon's strategy, who was interested in the engineering problem of transmitting very long messages with low probability of error. However, from a conceptual viewpoint, it makes sense to ask for the information generated at the source by the occurrence of one of its states. Moreover, since eqs. (1) and (2) have the form of a weighted average, it also makes sense to define the individual magnitudes on which the average is computed.
Therefore, the amount of information ( ) i I s generated at the source by the occurrence of 
( ) log(1 ( ))
When defined by eqs. (1) and (2) 
The distinction between conceiving the entropies of the source and the destination (Timpson 2004, p. 11) . In the few cases in which he speaks about the information that we would gain if the state i s were to occur (Timpson 2003, pp. 13-14) , it is conceived as a "surprise information" associated with i s , which only makes sense when i s is the outcome of a single experiment considered as a member of a long sequence of experiments −where, apparently, the probabilities are conceived as frequencies−.
Assuming the conceptual priority of ( ) H S over individual amounts of information allows Timpson to define the concept of information in terms of the noiseless coding theorem: "the coding theorems that introduced the classical (Shannon, 1948) and quantum (Schumacher, 1995) The first thing to notice here is that the strategy of defining information via the noiseless coding theorem turns the theorem into a definition. In fact, now the entropy ( ) H S of the source is not defined by eq. (1) as the average amount of information per letter generated by the source, but it is defined as the average number of bits necessary to code a letter of the source using an ideal code, and eq. (1) The fact that the entropy ( ) H S can be expressed in different units of measurement (bits, nats, Hartleys, etc.) , and that the messages of the source can be coded using different sets of symbols (Q-ary alphabets), also points to the conceptual difference between the amount of information associated with the occurrence of a state of the source and the number of binary symbols necessary to codify that event. In fact, one could measure the entropy ( ) H S of the source in Hartleys but codify the messages with a coding alphabet of two symbols, or measure ( ) H S in bits but codify the messages with a coding alphabet of ten symbols. In these cases, the result of the noiseless coding theorem has to be adapted by introducing the necessary change of measurement units. Of course, this might not be convenient from a practical viewpoint, but has nothing to do with the meaning of the concept of information. This situation is analogous to measuring a length in meters and decimeters, but then expressing it in a hexadecimal numerical system: this fact does not affect the meaning of the very concept of length.
When explaining the elements of the general communication system, Shannon (1948, p. 381) characterizes the transmitter as a system that operates on the message coming from the source in some way to produce a signal suitable for transmission over the channel. In many cases, such as in telegraphy, the transmitter is also responsible for encoding the source messages. However, in certain cases the message is not codified.
For instance, in traditional telephony the transmitter operates as a mere transducer, by changing sound pressure into a proportional electrical current. If one insists on defining information in terms of the noiseless coding theorem, how should one talk about information in those situations where no coding is involved?
None of these observations is an insurmountable criticism against defining information via the noiseless coding theorem. However, this definitional move conflates two aspects of communication that the traditional textbooks warned us not to conceptually confuse: the information generated at the source, which depends on its states and the probability distribution over them and is independent of coding −even of the very fact that the messages are coded or not−, and the number of symbols necessary to codify the occurrence of those states, which also depends on the alphabet used for codification. For Timpson, the conflation of these two aspects is not a serious problem to the extent that, as we will see in the next section, his deflationary position renders the concept of information void of any content other than referring to the entire protocol involved in communication. (Austin 1950, p. 25) .
4.-The deflationary interpretation of information
By relying on the analogy between 'truth' and 'information', Timpson takes these quotes to support his claim that 'information' is an abstract noun: "Austin's aim was to de-mystify the concept of truth, and make it amenable to discussion, by pointing to the fact that 'truth' is an abstract noun. So too is 'information'." (Timpson 2004, p. 3) . So, much of the plausibility of that claim depends on the reliability of the analogy.
Strawson's and Austin's quotes are taken from a well-known debate between the authors about the concept of truth. Whereas Austin intended to vindicate the correspondence theory of truth by reconstructing it in terms of certain demonstrative and descriptive conventions, Strawson took a deflationary stance according to which the predicate 'is true' has a performative rather than a descriptive function. In turn, the whole debate is framed in a semantic context in which truth is a prototypical semantic notion and the predicate 'is true' belongs to the metalanguage. Nothing of this sort happens in the case of the notion of information: in principle it is not one of the semantic concepts that have been traditionally analyzed by the philosophy of language, and it does not belong to a metalanguage that speaks about another language −object language−. On the other hand, the discussions about abstract nouns in general focus on the relation between the abstract-concrete dichotomy and the universal-particular dichotomy, on abstraction as the operation of removing particular features, on the different kinds of abstract nouns −those referring to mathematical entities, those derived from nominalization of adjectives or verbs, those naming fictional characters or musical or literary compositions, etc.−, among other issues; however, the semantic notion of truth does not appear in those discussions since it involves peculiar difficulties that are completely alien to the abstract-concrete question. Therefore, the appeal to the analogy with truth to argue for the abstract character of the word 'information' sounds as a forced analogy in the context of the philosophy of language. The first argument relies on defining Shannon information as a measure of the compressibility of messages (on the basis of the First Shannon Theorem) and mutual information as a measure of the capacity of the channel (on the basis of the Second Shannon Theorem) (Timpson 2004, p. 21) . Of course, these definitions favor the claim that information in its technical sense is an abstract item. However, as argued in the previous section, the entropy of the source can be defined as the average amount of information produced at the source without reference to coding (see eqs. (1) or (9)), and the strategy of defining information via the noiseless coding theorem can be objected for different reasons. Analogously, mutual information can be defined as the information generated at the source and received by the destination without reference to the capacity of the channel (see eqs. (3), (4) and (5)), which, in turn, can be defined in terms of the mutual information as usual (see eq. (6)). These definitions of the concepts of Shannon entropy and mutual information, are different from those proposed by
Timpson: taking eq. (1) and eq. (3) as the definitions of Shannon entropy and mutual information respectively, as usual, is compatible with interpretations of the technical concept of information which are different from the "abstract-noun" reading, in particular, with a physical interpretation of information (we will come back to this issue in Section 6). The point to emphasize here is that, in this first argument offered by Timpson, the conclusion about the abstract nature of information −in its technical sense− is a direct consequence of the previous decision about the way in which the relevant magnitudes are defined. In other words, this argument retrieves from the definition what was injected in it from the very beginning.
The second and best known argument relies on the philosophical distinction between types and tokens. Let us consider that the source produces the sequence of Of course, this argumentative strategy allows Timpson to dissolve many problems involved in the transmission of information, in particular those related with communication based on entanglement. For instance, in teleportation it is said that the very large −potentially infinite− amount of information required to specify the teletransported state is transferred from the source to the destination by sending only two classical bits and without a physical channel between them. This has lead many physicists to search for the physical link that can play the role of the carrier of information: for some, the information travels backwards in time to the event at which the entangled pair was produced and then travels forwards to the future (Penrose 1998; Jozsa 1998 Jozsa , 2004 ; for others, the information travels hidden in the classical bits (Deutsch and Hayden 2000) . With his abstract-noun interpretation of information, (Duwell 2008, p. 200) . But, as stressed above, the mapping is completely arbitrary, and the states of the source and the states of the destination may be of a completely different nature: for instance, the source may be a dice and the destination a dash of lights; or the source may be a device that produces words in
English and the destination a device that operates a machine. It is difficult to say in what sense a face of a dice and a light in a dash are tokens of a same type: which is the type in this case? The fact that any token is a token of different types does not mean that any two things arbitrarily chosen can always be conceived as tokens of the same type. As stressed above, admitting arbitrary functions as defining the relation "x is a token of the same type as the token y" deprives the distinction type-token of any philosophical content and conceptual usefulness (see Wetzel 2011) .
In his argumentative effort to retain the relevance of the type-token relationship to the elucidation of the nature of information −in its technical sense−, Duwell recalls the distinction, introduced by Timpson (2004, pp. 20-21) , between Shannon quantityinformation, which "is that which is quantified by the Shannon entropy" (Duwell 2008, p. 201 (Timpson 2004, p. 22) . This is a difference we have learned when studying logico-semantic topics, in order to avoid the confusion between the concrete instance of a sentence and its semantic content expressed by the proposition. Of course, when Timpson introduces the idea of type-information, he is not endowing types with meaning. However, a type needs to have some content to be able to identify its tokens: the distinction between types and tokens is not merely formal or syntactic. On the contrary, Shannon information is neutral with respect to any content, since the only relevant issue is the selection of a message among many. It seems that, although Timpson explicitly keeps distance from endowing information with any semantic content, certain semantic notions creeps up into his argumentation, in such a way that his concept of information turns out to acquire a sort of content completely alien to Shannon's original proposal.
Summing up, the arguments developed by Timpson in favor of the abstract nature of information are not conclusive. Nevertheless, the task of analyzing them has led us to notice that information in Shannon's theory is even more abstract than types. But, in
Timpson's general argumentation, the abstract nature of information is the cornerstone of his claim that information is not physical. Therefore, it seems that, from a different argumentative line, we should arrive at the same conclusion. However, this is not the case, as we will see in the next section.
5.-Why is information not physical?
According to Timpson, what is a physical item when they say, as Rolf Landauer (1991 Landauer ( , 1996 , that information is physical. If one does not want to turn the structure of non-formal languages into the clue witness about what exists and does not exist in the physical world, a more reasonable strategy seems to be to admit that the physical world is the world that physics talks about. Therefore, in order to decide whether or not a certain item belongs to the physical world, it is necessary to see what role it plays in physical science.
From this perspective, the first thing to notice is that it is not necessary to be a substance, or a concrete thing, or a material entity, to be physical. The realm of physics is populated by countless properties, usually referred to as 'observables', which are not property. But the decision about conceiving a noun belonging to particular physical theory as naming an individual entity, a stuff or a property is not fixed by grammar, but depends on the interpretation of the particular theory considered. In any case, it is not necessary to be a substance or a material determinate thing to be a physical item.
From a philosophical perspective, it is well known that physics, far from being a static body of knowledge, changes substantially through history. In this process, concepts undergo deep mutations that modify the worldview described by physics. Let us consider, for instance, the concept of a wave, which begins by referring to a property of a physical medium: a wave is nothing else than an abstract description of how a material medium changes its properties in space and/or in time. In this sense, the concept of a wave does not belong to the category of substance, but to the category of property: there are no waves without a material medium that carries them. However, with the development of physics waves become something that do not need an underlying material substratum to exist. Although at present the ontological status of a field is still under debate, it is agreed that a field is something that exists by itself, with no need of a material medium, and that has its own properties and its specific physical description (for a historical account of this transformation, see Berkson 1974) .
The example of waves shows that physics, in its evolution, tends to perform a substantialization of certain concepts 4 : from originally being conceived as properties, certain magnitudes turn into substances, but not in the sense of becoming kinds of stuff, referents of mass nouns −the sense used by Timpson−, but in the Aristotelian sense ("primary substance" in Categories) of being objects of predication but not predicable of anything else, and being bearers of properties (see Robinson 2014) . One might wonder whether the −technical− concept of information is undergoing a mutation analogous to that experienced by the concept of waves, and is beginning to be conceived as a physical magnitude that exists by itself, without the need of a material carrier supporting it.
A concept that immediately comes to one's mind when thinking about a physical interpretation of information is that of energy, since energy also seems to be something "abstract" and non-material, at least when compared to, say, a molecule. Timpson considers the analogy between information and energy, but assumes that, by contrast to 'information', 'energy' is a property name. In the context of this analogy, he asks whether information is "adventitious", that is, added from without, from the perspective of the pragmatic interest of an agent: "Is it a fundamental one? […] Or is it an adventitious one: of the nature of an addition from without; an addition from the parochial perspective of an agent wishing to treat some system informationtheoretically, for whatever reason?" (Timpson 2008, pp. 46-47 ; emphasis in the original). Also with respect to this aspect the comparison with energy is relevant. In fact, in the context of strict Newtonian mechanics, the concept of energy is subsidiary to the dynamical description of a system; in Timpson's terms, it is an adventitious concept designed to measure the capacity of a system to perform a certain task −work−.
However, in the framework of physics as a whole, it acquired its own, not merely adventitious, reference, and became one of the fundamental physical concepts. The words of William Thomson in the nineteenth century already express clearly this transformation: "The very name energy, though first used in its present sense by Dr.
Thomas Young about the beginning of this century, has only come into use practically after the doctrine which defines it had […] been raised from a mere formula of mathematical dynamics to the position it now holds of a principle pervading all nature
and guiding the investigator in every field of science" (Thomson 1881, p. 475) . At present, the word 'energy' does not refer to something concrete: if a perturbation in a physical medium is transmitted between two points of space, nothing material is transmitted; nevertheless, there is transference of energy between those points. And although sometimes it is still used as a property name, in general energy has acquired a substantial nature −in the Aristotelian sense− that plays a central unifying role in physics: energy is a magnitude essentially referred to by absolutely all present-day physical theories; it is conceived as something that can be generated, accumulated, stored, processed, converted from one form to another, and transmitted from one place to another.
In his insistence on depriving information of physical nature, Timpson says that "Quantum information theory and quantum computation are theories about what we can do using physical systems" (Timpson 2004, p. 33 ; emphasis in the original).
Following with the analogy with energy, one can say that the concept of energy also began as a tool to describe what we can do with physical systems. However, its status gradually changed with the historical development of physics: now energy is an undoubtedly physical item which, although non-material, plays an essential role in physical sciences. In the light of the strong presence of the concept of information in present-day physics, it is not difficult to suppose that it is following a historical trajectory analogous to that followed by the concept of energy in the nineteenth century.
Summing up, it is quite clear that the world described by contemporary physics is not a world of material individuals and stuffs. This traditional ontology was superseded by the world of quantum field theory, where particles lose any classical feature and fields become substantial items (see, e.g., Kuhlmann 2010), and by the general relativistic universe, where energy acquires a sort of "materiality" and space-time is no longer a neutral container of material things (see, e.g., Earman 1989). Once one admits that it is physics and not grammar that decides if an item is physical or not, it is clear that it does not matter what kinds of words are used to refer to properties, such as charge and mass, and to name items that acquired substantiality through the history of science, such as fields and energy. What only matters is that all those items inhabit the world of physics, that is, according to physics they are part of the furniture of the world.
And this implies that contemporary physics offers no grounds to deny the possibility of a meaningful physical interpretation of the concept of information. (Shannon 1993, 180) . If this pluralistic stance was worthy of consideration in Shannon's times, at present it is even more plausible given the fact that the concept of information has permeated almost all the domains of science. From this perspective, it is philosophically interesting to realize that there are different interpretations of the concept of information, each useful in a different specific context.
6.-The many faces of information
Once the focus is on non-semantic information, the first step consists in specifying the formal context that frames the discussion about the meaning of the concept of information. In fact, although Shannon's theory is the traditional formalism to quantify information, it is not the only one. For instance, Fisher information measures the dependence of a random variable X on an unknown parameter θ upon which the probability of X depends (Fisher 1925) , and algorithmic information measures the length of the shortest program that produces a string on a universal Turing machine (Chaitin 1987) . In quantum information theory, von Neumann entropy gives a measure of the quantum resources necessary to faithfully encode the state of the source-system (Schumacher 1995 (Bell 1957, p. 7) , and that it must be relativized with respect to the background knowledge available before the transmission: "the datum point of information is then the whole body of knowledge possessed at the receiving end before the communication." (ibid., p.
7). In certain cases, the epistemic interpretation of information is what served as the basis for philosophically motivated attempts to add a semantic dimension to a formal theory of information (MacKay 1969; Nauta 1972; Dretske 1981) .
It is worth noting that, from the epistemic perspective, the possibility of acquiring knowledge about the source of information by consulting the state of the destination is rooted in the nomic connection between them, that is, in the lawfulness of the regularities underlying the whole situation. In fact, the conditional probabilities that define the channel do not represent merely de facto correlations; they are determined by a network of lawful connections between the states of the source and the states of the destination.
A different view about information is that which detaches the concept from the notion of knowledge and considers information as a physical magnitude. This is the position of many physicists (see, e.g., Rovelli 1996) and most engineers, for whom the essential feature of information consists in its capacity to be generated at one point of the physical space and transmitted to another point; it can also be accumulated, stored and converted from one form to another. In this case, the capability of providing knowledge is not a central issue, since the transmission of information can be used only for control purposes, such as operating a device at the destination end by modifying the state of the source. According to this view, it is precisely because of the physical nature of information that the dynamics of its flow is constrained by physical laws and facts:
"Information handling is limited by the laws of physics and the number of parts available in the universe" (Landauer 1991, p. 29 ; see also Bennett and Landauer 1985) .
In general, the physical interpretation of information appears strongly linked with the idea expressed by the well-known dictum 'no information without representation': the transmission of information between two points of the physical space necessarily requires an information-bearing signal, that is, a physical process propagating from one point to the other. Landauer is an explicit defender of this position when he claims that " (1996, p. 188 ). This view is also adopted by some philosophers of science; for instance, Peter Kosso states that "information is transferred between states through interaction." (1989, p. 37) . The need of a carrier signal sounds natural in the light of the generic idea that physical influences can only be transferred through interactions. On this basis, information is conceived by many physicists as a physical entity with the same ontological status as energy; it has also been claimed that its essential property is the power to manifest itself as structure when added to matter (Stonier 1990 (Stonier , 1996 .
The difference between the epistemic and the physical interpretations of information is not merely nominal, but may yield different conclusions regarding certain common physical situations. For instance, in the important philosophical tradition that explains scientific observation in terms of information (Shapere 1982 , Brown 1987 , Kosso 1989 , the way in which information is conceived leads to very different consequences regarding observation. This turns out to be particularly clear in the so-called 'negative experiments' (see Jammer 1974) , in which it is assumed that an object or event has been observed by noting the absence of some other object or event.
From the informational view of scientific observation, observation without a direct physical interaction between the observed object and an appropriate destination is only admissible from an epistemic interpretation of information. According to a physical interpretation, by contrast, detection at the destination end does not amount to the observation of the object: the presence of the object is only inferred (see Lombardi   2004 ). It is interesting to wonder whether taking into account the distinction between the epistemic and the physical interpretations of information could contribute to unravel the puzzles involved in the informational interpretation of quantum entanglement, in particular, of teleportation (see Timpson 2006) .
This presentation of the difference between the epistemic and the physical interpretations of Shannon information may suggest that the two interpretations are rival and, as a consequence, it is necessary to decide for one of them. Nevertheless, as it will be argued in the next section, this is not necessarily the case.
7.-Information: formalism and interpretations
Although the physical interpretation of information prevailed in the traditional textbooks used for engineers' training, this situation has changed in recent times: in general, present-day textbooks introduce information theory from a formal perspective, with no mention of transmitters, receivers or signals, and the basic concepts are explained in terms of random variables and probability distributions over their possible values. Only when the formalism has been presented, is the theory applied to the The idea that the concept of information is completely formal is not new. Already
Aleksandr Khinchin (1957) and Fazlollah Reza (1961) conceived information theory as a new chapter of the theory of probability. From this perspective, Shannon information not only is not a physical magnitude, but also loses its nomic ingredient: the mutual information between two random variables can be defined even if there is no lawful relationship between them and the conditional probabilities connecting them express only de facto correlations.
If the concept of information is purely formal and belongs to a mathematical theory, the word 'information' does not pertain to the language of empirical sciences −or to any referential language−: it has no extralinguistic reference in itself. Its "meaning" has only a syntactic dimension. According to this view, the generality of the concept of Shannon information derives from its exclusively formal nature; and this generality is what makes it a powerful formal tool for empirical science, applicable to a wide variety of fields.
From this formal perspective, the relationship between the word 'information' and the different views about the nature of information is the logical relationship between a mathematical object and its interpretations, each one of which endows the term with a specific referential content. The epistemic view, then, is one of the many different interpretations, which may be applied in different technical domains, for example, in the attempts to ground a theory of knowledge on informational bases (Dretske 1981) , or in psychology and cognitive sciences to conceptualize the human abilities of acquiring knowledge (see, e.g., Hoel, Albantakis and Tononi 2013).
At the same time, the physical view, which turns information into a physical , and even in evolutionary biology, where it has been argued that abstract patterns in evolutionary processes can be described using informational concepts (Harms 2004 ).
Summing up, from a perspective that conceives the concept of information −in the context of Shannon's theory− as a formal concept, the epistemic and the physical interpretations are no longer rival, but they rather become two of the several possible interpretations of that formal concept. Of course, this pluralist strategy does not solve by itself the many problems involved in the widespread use of informational notions in most fields of science. However, the clear differentiation between the several interpretations of information is a first step towards overcoming those obstacles based in misunderstandings that prevent conceptual agreements.
8.-Conclusions
The concept of information is one of the most elusive in the context of present-day philosophy of science, not only due to its abstract character, but also because it appears in multiple and varied scientific disciplines. It is for this reason that the philosophical analysis of its meaning and scope is nowadays an urgent task. In this sense, the works of
Timpson constitute an outstanding contribution to the field, since they have brought to the fore many aspects of the concept of information: the domain of application of Shannon's theory (Timpson 2003) , the relation between information transmission and quantum entanglement (Timpson 2005) , the interpretation of teleportation (Timpson 2006) , the nature of quantum information and its relation with the interpretations of quantum mechanics (Timpson 2008 (Timpson , 2013 , among others. Nevertheless, the acknowledgement of the high value of his work does not amount to uncritical agreement.
In this article we have focused, in particular, on Timpson's elucidation of the concept of information, according to which 'information' is an abstract noun and, as a consequence, information is not part of the physical contents of the world. Here we proposed a strategy in a certain sense opposed to that of Timpson: instead of attempting
